Application of non-cooperative game theory to energy-aware queueing systems

I. Quintela Atxutegi, J. Doncel Vicente

We formulate a non-cooperative game in a queueing system formed by K sensor nodes in which energy is required to transmit traffic. Each sensor node is a player that controls the rate at which energy at its node is generated. All the sensor nodes send packets to a gateway node, where collisions occur when the received traffic is high. Each player aims to maximize the number of packets generated at its node that do not collide. We first characterize the best-response of one player to the strategy of the rest of the players. Furthermore, we analyze the solution of this game and show that, under some conditions, there exists a unique symmetric Nash equilibrium. For future work, we will explore the global optimum strategy, i.e., which is the strategy that minimizes the total number of packets that do not collide to study the efficiency of the obtained Nash equilibrium.

Keywords: EPN, Nash Equilibrium

GT Teoría de Juegos IV: aplicaciones
September 4, 2026  11:10 AM
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