Weighted Variants of the Sequential Equal Contributions Rule

A. Bernárdez Ferradás, M. Á. Mirás Calvo, C. Quinteiro Sandomingo, E. Sánchez Rodríguez

In the context of airport problems, the Sequential Equal Contributions rule is one of the most commonly used rules, as it satisfies several desirable properties. According to this rule, agents contribute step by step, each covering an equal share of the remaining cost. To extend this approach, we present different weighted versions of the original rule, defining new families of rules in which agents contribute based on a predetermined weight vector. We provide an axiomatic characterization of these rules, incorporating axioms specifically designed for their structure. Finally, we show an illustrative example of its application, highlighting its practical relevance for a real-world cost allocation scenario.

Keywords: Cost allocation, airport problems, Sequential Equal Contributions rule, weighted rules, axiomatic characterization

GT Teoría de Juegos III: valores
September 4, 2026  9:00 AM
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