Cost allocation in hazardous waste transportation networks

G. Bergantiños, A. Navarro Ramos

This paper examines cost allocation in hazardous waste transportation modeled by a tree-structured network. Agents located at the nodes of the network must transport certain quantities of waste to a treatment facility, with each edge incurring maintenance costs that increase with the amount of waste transported. We formalize the problem as a cooperative game with transferable utility, where the cost of each coalition is determined by the sum of the maintenance costs of the edges used by its members. Two cost allocation rules are analyzed: the traditional Shapley value and a new one called the liability rule. The liability rule assigns costs based on actual network usage, ensuring that agents are not charged for unused segments or for cost increases due to wastage in excess of their own. We perform an axiomatic analysis of the rules.

Palabras clave: Cooperative game theory, Cost allocation, Tree networks, Hazardous waste transportation

Teoría de Juegos II
5 de septiembre de 2026  16:00
Aula 22

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