Some Results on Monotonicity in Cost Sharing

M. J. Albizuri Irigoien, J. M. Zarzuelo Zarzosa

Several axiomatizations of the Aumann–Shapley cost-sharing method have been proposed in the literature for both the discrete and the continuous settings. These characterizations usually rely on monotonicity axioms together with additional requirements related to symmetry and rescaling. In this paper, we provide two alternative axiomatizations of the method in which the axioms other than monotonicity are weakened. In this way, our results offer new foundations for the Aumann–Shapley method while preserving the central role of monotonicity in its characterization.

Keywords: Cost sharing, Aumann-Shapley prices, monotonicity

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