Minimum Quantity Commitments in Cooperative Agri-Food Export Markets

A. Meca Martínez, L. Guardiola, B. Hezarkani

International trade offers significant opportunities for agri-food communities. However, accessing these markets can be costly, especially for small and medium-sized enterprises, and trade policies that impose minimum quantity commitments on export volumes, such as licensing tariff rate quota mechanisms, further complicate matters. We demonstrate how
cooperation among agri-food exporters can help overcome these barriers and enhance market access for SMEs. By formulating a framework of cooperative games, we identify a gain-sharing mechanism that produces allocations within the corresponding cores, enabling stable grand coalitions of exporters. Our allocation rule exclusively benefits “essential” exporters. As a result, less cost-efficient “complementary”players, necessary for meeting MQCs, receive no direct benefits from collaboration and must participate altruistically. We then propose two modifications: one based on egalitarian principles and the other on revenue-based rates,

Palabras clave: Cooperative Games, Export markets, Quantity Commitments

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4 de septiembre de 2026  09:00
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