A bargaining approach to the Harsanyi value
J. Vidal-Puga
This paper presents a bargaining approach to extend the Harsanyi value for non-transferable utility (NTU) games under restrictions on coalition formation. It characterizes the Harsanyi solution through axiomatic foundations subgame perfect equilibrium in a non-cooperative bargaining protocols, including scenarios with external options and pre-agreements that may have different binding degree. The result offers a further understanding of how constrained coalition behaviors and outside options influence the distribution of payoffs, providing insights relevant for cooperative bargaining and game theory with complete information.
Palabras clave: Harsanyi NTU value, nontransferable utility game, subgame perfect equilibrium, bargaining
Programado
GT Teoría de Juegos III: valores
4 de septiembre de 2026 09:00
Aula 22
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