Open shop scheduling games under uncertainty.

M. Verdés Enrich, S. Miquel Fernández, P. Calleja Cortés

We study α-open shop scheduling problem where processing times remain equal across machines, while weights are heterogeneous across jobs. Further, these weights representing per-unit waiting costs are not known with certainty. Given an initial schedule, an interval cooperative game is associated in which the value of each coalition is an interval of maximum cost savings that can be achieved through admissible rearrangements. The resulting α-open shop scheduling game under uncertainty is then analysed, with particular attention to the interval core of the related interval game.

Palabras clave: interval game, scheduling, interval core

GT Teoría de Juegos III: valores
4 de septiembre de 2026  09:00
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